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Abstract: »Pioniere und Herausforderer in der globalen Plasma Protein Industrie, 
1915-2015«. Entrepreneurship in the science-based industries is often the result 
of collective actions undergone by entrepreneurial groups. The origins of the 
biotech industry provide many examples. In the plasma protein industry, which 
has registered a continuous growth since 1910 and an accelerated process of 
mergers and acquisitions in the last decades, there are three leading corpora-
tions whose history reflects collective entrepreneurship: Baxter with headquar-
ters in the United States (start 1931), CSL Behring in Australia (start 1916) and 
Grifols in Spain (start in plasma business in 1940). This article provides a histor-
ical overview of the industry and how the making of collective entrepreneur-
ship allowed a challenger like Grifols, from a late industrialized country such as 
Spain, to cross entry barriers in the plasma industry, buy many of the pioneer-
ing corporations, and establish a global leadership position. This article argues 
that the long-term trust-based personal and professional relationships estab-
lished by the entrepreneurial Spanish family lab, with managers from the US 
and Japanese corporations, produced a collective entrepreneurial hub of con-
nections that made possible a long-term sustained process of innovation and 
globalization in a highly specialized biomedical industry. 
Keywords: Biotech Industries, Plasma Protein Industry, Grifols, Baxter, CSL. 
1.   Introduction1  
Entrepreneurship is often an individual virtue, but in knowledge intensive 
industries it is more commonly the result of collective entrepreneurship (Mino-
glou and Cassis 2005; Ács and Audretsch 2010; Jones and Wadwhani 2007). 
The world plasma industry analyzed in this article is a particularly good exam-
ple that demonstrates the significance of trust-based entrepreneurial groups that 
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exchange knowledge over time, not just to grow and expand, but to reduce the 
potential risks their operations may have in the lives and well-being of millions 
of people and in their own business survival.  
The plasma industry has experienced a strong growth, from $5 billion in 
global sales in 2000 to over $14 billion today.2 The plasma industry’s raw 
material is expensive (70% total costs) because of the small quantities collected 
from donors, the costs of the plasmapheresis equipment, the fractionation pro-
cess, the highly qualified staff, and the costs of quality control processes  
involved in the collection, manufacturing and distribution of the products in-
volved. The industry is now very concentrated in three big corporations, but 
they all started as small start-ups able to grow by creating tightly linked entre-
preneurial groups in a long-term process that started one hundred years ago 
(Curling, Goss, and Bertolini 2015).  
Plasma is the liquid portion of blood and constitutes 55% of blood, the re-
maining 45% being red blood cells. The first and most important human plas-
ma protein whose obtention the industry sought from the 1940s until the 1980s 
was albumin (55-60% of plasma protein), which was helpful in the rapid resus-
citation of people from life shocks due to heavy blood loss (Curling, Goss, and 
Bertolini 2015). In the last decades, new knowledge has allowed the obtention 
of new plasma proteins and the application of said plasma proteins in the de-
velopment of new therapeutical products used in a great variety of neurologi-
cal, autoimmunitary, and cardiovascular diseases (Robert 2015). 
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This article provides new empirical evidence about the role played by col-
lective entrepreneurship in very specialized science-based industries, in the 
specialized market niche of the plasma industry. The hypothesis is that during 
almost half a century there has been a close communication between the pio-
neering entrepreneurs and firms that established the learning bases of the indus-
try in the US, Australia, and Germany. They opened new communication chan-
nels with new small challengers from developing economies like Spain. The 
case of Grifols, one of the top three plasma producers in the world in the early 
21st century, shows the enduring relevance of entrepreneurial groups in this 
industry. The dialogue between different business cultures and the construction 
of corporate alliances was facilitated, on the one hand, by personal friendship 
and trust-based professional relationships established between the Spanish lab 
and both relatives and close colleagues, and on the other by relationships with 
German labs and managers of scientific corporations from Cuba, North Ameri-
ca, and Japan. 
2. The Pioneers of the World Plasma Industry 
Currently in the early 21st century, the plasma industry is heavily concentrated. 
The top seven plasma collectors owned by plasma fractionators collect millions 
of liters of plasma and are: BioLife (owned by Baxter), BioMat, PlasmaCare 
and Talecris Plasma Resources (owned by Grifols), CSL Plasma (owned by 
CSL Ltd.), Octapharma Plasma (owned by Octapharma), and Advanced Bi-
oservices (owned by Kedrion SpA). The first three companies collect over 75% 
of the total US plasma. Most of the plasma-collecting companies are based in 
the US, as it is the main source of plasma worldwide.3 
The early growth of the industry in the first four decades of the twentieth 
century is inextricably linked to the history of modern warfare and the power of 
imperial armies to spend a huge amount of effort and money from public 
sources on the investment into research and cooperation with private firms. The 
first blood banks for the massive collection of human blood for transfusion 
appeared in close connection with World War I (United Kingdom, Russia) and 
the Spanish Civil War, under the auspices of governments and armies.  
Table 1: Pioneers in World Blood Banking (BB) and Plasma Fractionation (PF) 
COUNTRY PIONEER DATE BB DATE PF 
UK British Red Cross 1921 
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USSR Sergei Yudin 1930 
Spain Frederic Duran i Jordà 1936 1951 (Grifols) 
USA Edwin Cohn/Armour Labs 
( )
1940 1940 
Germany Emil von B./ Behringwerke 1939? 1946 
Australia William Penfold/ CSL 1929 1952 
Switzerland ZLB 1939 1949 
Japan Ryoichi Naito / Green Cross 1950 1971 
Argentina Laboratorio de Hemoderivados 1914? 1964/74 
Source: Own elaboration with secondary sources from each country and corporation in table 
and Curling, Goss, and Bertolini (2015). 
 
The blood banks were new organizations that allowed regular and abundant 
collection of human blood, the raw material from which plasma must be ob-
tained. Plasma extraction was initially very expensive and difficult before the 
1940s and national public health systems, with few exceptions, did not have 
enough highly qualified scientists able to focus in the long-term research in-
volved in industrializing the production of abundant plasma extraction until 
after World War II.  
The first large public-private agreements signed to finance new industrial 
ways to produce and distribute albumin quickly, safely, and in larger quantities 
came after the attack on Pearl Harbor in the United States in December 1941 
and continued throughout World War II.  This was done in order to be used for 
the resuscitation of soldiers in shock on the battlefield. The US Army drew up 
seven contracts in 1941 with Armour, Lederle, Upjohn Co., Eli Lily Laborato-
ries, E.R. Squibb, Cutter Laboratories, and Sharp and Dohme to expand frac-
tionation and production of human albumin for the US soldiers. These compa-
nies became the first commercial fractionators, and two of them (Armour and 
Cutter Laboratories) remained in the business after the war and the expiration 
of the 1941 contracts. The others were concerned about availability of plasma 
and viability of the industry if they did not have a strong (or guaranteed) mili-
tary demand (Kendrick 1942; Curling, Goss, and Bertolini 2015).  
Cutter Laboratories was founded in 1897 and began plasma fractionation in 
1942, becoming the first commercial producer of albumin (Cutter 1975). After 
completion of its facilities in Clayton, North Carolina, it was acquired by the 
German Bayer AG in 1974. In 2005, it became known as Talecris and, in 2011, 
was acquired by the Spanish Grifols in what was known as the largest foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the pharma industry in the US that year (Grifols 
2015; Fernández Pérez, Puig, García-Canal, and Guillén 2017).  
Armour and Company built a manufacturing plant in 1943 under a US Navy 
contract at Fort Worth, Texas and was the largest supplier of albumin to the US 
Army during World War II. After the war in 1953, they established a new 
fractionation plant in Kankakee, Illinois. The company was acquired in 1977 
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by Revlon, by Rorer Pharmaceutical in 1986, and merged with Rhône-Poulenc 
in 1990. 
Baxter, the world’s largest manufacturer and distributor of hospital supplies 
and provider of medical specialty products serving over 5,000 hospitals, was 
founded in 1931 by two Iowa physicians, Ralph Falk and Donald Baxter. In 
1933, they opened a plant in Glenview, Chicago with six employees and sold 
products through the American Hospital Supply Corporation4. During World 
War II, Baxter provided blood collection products and intravenous solutions to 
the US Army. In the 1950s, they expanded to Cleveland, Mississippi and, in 
1952, acquired Hyland Laboratories of Los Angeles, a firm that had produced 
freeze-dried plasma during the war. In 1953, they built a large new manufactur-
ing plant in Los Angeles (California) to produce a variety of blood and plasma 
protein products and, in 1959, acquired both Flint, Eaton and Company and 
Fenwal Laboratories of Boston. Baxter shares began trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1961.5  
Courtland Laboratories was founded in 1947, received a license to produce 
plasma products in 1950, and manufactured animal albumin based products for 
Max Factor, Merck Sharpe & Dohme It was acquired by Abbott Scientific 
Products (a division of Abbott Laboratories) in 1967 and sold in 1978 to the 
Japanese Green Cross Corporation which changed the name to Alpha Thera-
peutic Corporation. The Spanish Grifols signed a joint venture with Alpha 
Therapeutic Corporation in 1982, which lasted until 1999, and, in 2009, they 
bought Alpha’s assets and established the firm Grifols USA that year (Grifols 
2015). 
In the early years of the 1950s, plasma fractionation in the United States was 
a commercial enterprise with very few not-for-profit players (e.g., American 
Red Cross, Massachusetts Biological Laboratories), whereas in Europe there 
was an important not-for-profit plasma sector around national Red Cross socie-
ties, and a commercial sector. Among the commercial fractionators, the early 
pioneers in Europe were Behringwerke AG and Biotest in Germany, the Barce-
lona Blood Service in Spain, Institute Mérieux in France, Berna in Italy, and 
Kabi in Sweden. In Japan, there was a strong commercial private sector, as in 
the United States in the 1950s, led by the Green Cross Corporation. Until the 
1990s in Australia, when CSL was privatized, and in China until today, public 
organizations led both in research and in plasma collection and fractionation 
(Curling, Goss, and Bertolini 2015; Grifols 2015). 
In the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, pioneers such as the 
German Behringwerke and the Swiss ZLB had been acquired by the Australian 
CSL. At roughly the same time, world pioneering leaders of the US, like Cutter 
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and Armour, had been acquired initially by German, Swiss, and Japanese com-
petitors, and finally by the Spanish Grifols. 
Grifols was a micro family lab in 1940, almost disappeared in 1965 when 
Spain prohibited plasma exports, and could have disappeared in the 1980s with 
the AIDS crisis, which led big leaders, such as the Green Cross Corporation of 
Japan or Landerlan in Madrid, into decline or collapse.  
What competitive factors may help explain is how a small company in a late 
industrialized country like Spain could have challenged the pioneering leaders 
in a highly concentrated and knowledge intensive biotech industry like that of 
the world plasma protein industry? Available literature highlights the organiza-
tional and executive capabilities of emerging multinationals from developing 
economies and the accelerated process of acquisitions and investments abroad 
in the last decades (Guillén and Garcia-Canal 2009 and 2010), as well as their 
outward-looking networks (Fernández Pérez and Puig 2007; Fernández Pérez 
and Rose 2010). This perspective fits well with findings that highlight the role 
of relations and groups in the development of business opportunities in new 
industries (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). For this article, these perspectives allow 
the theoretical interpretation of empirical findings from private archives of the 
Grifols Corporation. This case study demonstrates that innovative entrepre-
neurial groups with close personal and professional links among them have 
been able to create tangible and intangible knowledge, helping the company 
overcome backwardness and become a world leader in a very specialized, 
knowledge intensive industry. 
3. Challengers in the World Plasma Industry after World 
War II: Grifols 
3.1  From a Partnership with Professional Colleagues to a Family-
Based Laboratory 1880-1940s  
Since the late 19th century, the Grifols family was a family of scientists. They 
were open-minded and innovative and, for this reason and despite the back-
wardness of their country, they maintained friendly networks with scientific 
colleagues from the foremost labs of leading countries, allowing them the abil-
ity to update their knowledge of laboratory analysis. There were three distinc-
tive periods in this process of entrepreneurial networking: a) until World War II 
with German corporations, b) between the 1940s and the 1980s with North 
American corporations, and c) from then onwards with Japanese and North 
American corporations.  
Small but technologically updated clinical laboratories were well established 
in Barcelona by the late 1880s and helped public authorities with the preven-
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tion and control of cholera and malaria. Graduates of Medicine and Pharmacy 
from the University of Barcelona saw an opportunity to improve their lives by 
joining forces to open new laboratories with the new products and technology 
of the time (e.g., vaccines, nutritional products, microscopes, analytical proofs 
and devices). There was not much initial investment; for many, small, empty, 
rented shops could be the start. José Antonio Grifols y Roig was one of those 
graduates who, after finishing his degree in Medicine in 1909, studied clinical 
analysis with the professors at the University of Munich and in German labora-
tories. In 1909, he opened the Instituto de Análisis Clínicos in Plaza Ur-
quinaona, near Plaza Cataluña, with two colleagues and friends who were 
doctors or lab specialists (Luis Celis, Ricardo Moragas, and the cooperation of 
Dr. Gordan, the former director of the Bacteriology Department in Danzig). 
The threee Spanish partners shared technical and managerial responsibilities as 
well as ownership until 1923. The institute carried out biological research with 
the latest German technologies, elaborating preventive vaccines against typhoi-
dea fever, cholera, Mediterranean fever, and others. Also, the clinical tests of 
Abderhalden and Wasserman for the diagnosis of illnesses such as syphillis and 
other venereal diseases became very common in Barcelona at this time for 
patients entering public and religious hospitals (Grifols 2011; Arxiu Hospital 
Santa Creu i Sant Pau Llibres Majors and Entry Registers of New Patients 1921 
and 1935). Their reputation and prestige was soon consolidated and the in-
crease in clients (i.e., private doctors, hospitals, patients) encouraged them to 
invest the profits in a larger apartment in Rambla de Cataluña near Provenza 
Street in 1923. In the years that followed, 30 new clinics and institutes also 
moved from downtown to the healthier districts of the Eixample, far from the 
harbor. The success led the three Spanish partners to split and follow individual 
enterprises. Grifols Roig would be the only owner, director, and technical ex-
pert of his new firm, Instituto Central de Análisis Clínicos, Bacteriológicos, y 
Químicos. Concurrently, he would direct the Histopathology laboratory at the 
Hospital de Santa Cruz, teach hemathology at the Academy of Medical Scienc-
es in Barcelona, and intern in the laboratory of the Faculty of Medicine in 
Barcelona. The Barcelona House of Ganzer provided him with most of the 
clinical instruments and most of his clients were doctors who needed a clear 
diagnosis before recommending treatment to their patients. Grifols employed 
five doctors and chemists to help him in the technical tasks of the laboratory, 
four Spaniards and one German (Hellmut H. Hempel). Due to his experience in 
blood extraction, he started trying blood transfusion in 1925-26.6 Grifols would 
preserve his friendships and scientific cooperations he made with his first part-
ners: Luis Celis Pujol became a full professor of Histology and Patological 
Anatomy in the Faculty of Medicine in Barcelona in 1923 and Ricardo Mora-
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gas was the director of the Laboratory of Bacteriology and Serology at the 
Hospital de Santa Cruz and owned his own private laboratory of analysis.  
Since 1928, the activity of blood transfusion, collection, and the manufactur-
ing of plasma derivatives would become increasingly the center of the entre-
preneurship and innovation for the Grifols Company. That same year, Grifols 
presented a new, indirect method of blood transfusion at the Catalan Academy 
of Medical Sciences. In 1929, he presented new studies about blood groups in 
the Iberian Peninsula and, in 1933 he presented in the Vilafranca del Penedés 
Hospital his new device (“flébula”) for safe transfusions of blood, and in that 
year and 1934 the leading directors of the public hospitals of Barcelona require 
his services: Pedro Pons in Hospital Clínica; Dr. Ribas in Hospital de San 
Pablo; Dr. Clara in the Quinta de Salud La Alianza.7 Because his team of expe-
rienced professionals and his reputation were large, he registered many new 
incremental innovations to promote his method of indirect transfusion of blood 
between the late 1920s and 1930s. 
The laboratory produced new clinical devices with registered patents, vac-
cines (against typhus, diarrhea), and nutritional products. German and Spanish 
experts in clinical analysis and in the production of microbiological products 
cooperated with Grifols (Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Hirsch, Dr. Hempel, Dr. Cantó, 
and Dr. Cuevas). His two sons, José Antonio (born 1917) and Victor (born 
1919) Grifols Lucas grew up in the lab. From the very young age of 17 (José 
Antonio) and 15 (Victor), their father taught them how to help him perform 
urine tests, glucose tests, and even the Wasserman test (Grifols 2011, 40). Soon 
thereafter, the two sons were participating in the routine of the firm and active-
ly engaging in the family’s entrepreneurial endeavors. During the Spanish Civil 
War, the sons gained pioneering experience working for the Spanish blood 
bank of Dr. Duran Jordà on the Republican battlefield. Their return home 
meant a redefinition of the father’s business. The Institute disappeared and a 
new firm was established in 1940, Laboratorios Grifols S.A., including Grifols 
Roig and his wife, Magdalena Lucas, as partners. In 1946, Mr. Brasó, a local 
business angel and friend, would become a financial partner and remain so 
until his death. Bringing in their experience from the blood bank, Grifols’ sons 
also participated in the newly expanded and renewed activities of the family lab 
while continuing their university studies. The family lab manufactured dry 
plasma, a new original product, which multiplied the output of each blood 
donation by several times.8 An entrepreneurial group based on family ties and 
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friendship was born, reducing potential unaffordable expenses they could have 
had to face if they would have had to hire or partner external high qualified 
professionals in the hard times of post-civil war Spain. 
In 1944, the good expectations of growth achieved with sacrifice, excel-
lence, and trust, made the small family based entrepreneurial group move to a 
new large building. The change made it possible to divide activities strictly 
(e.g., vaccines, analysis, rabbit testing) and to maintain the administrative of-
fice in the apartment of las Ramblas. Grifols registered several patents with the 
support of a collaborator, Walter Oppenheimer, and his sons: after the instru-
ment for indirect transfusion in 1928 and 1929, a process to dry plasma in 
1943, a table to register blood groups in 1949, the brand “Banco de Sangre y 
Plasma” in 1950, and several products that improve the extraction and fraction-
ation of blood in patents in 1957, 1961, 1964, 1965, and 1966. 9 
Grifols then decided to open the first civil blood bank in Spain in 1945, the 
Hemobanco.10 To maintain the reputation of the lab, the father decided that he 
would be only the manager of Laboratorios Grifols S.A. and that his son, José 
Antonio, would be the only manager at the new blood bank. From 1945 until 
1960, the blood bank performed around 200,000 blood extractions, a volume 
that made the family decide to reinvest profits from the two family firms into a 
new plant for blood extraction in Badalona, a city near Barcelona. The experi-
ence in blood collection, preservation, storage, and manipulation made the 
father and sons experiment with dry plasma and with plasma fractionation to 
obtain and separate proteins with which to produce different plasma derivative 
products. The method of plasmapheresis was developed and officially present-
ed in 1951 at a scientific congress in Lisbon where Edwin J. Cohn was in at-
tendance. A centrifuge machine was also presented that performed plasmapher-
esis; it was patented in 1965 and soon used for plasma extraction in Spain and 
in the United States in the context of the joint alliance and agreements between 
Grifols and the US Corporation Dade Reagents which led to the foundation of 
Dade-Grifols.11 
The investments moved José Antonio Grifols Roig to expand the capital of 
the society and include in 1946, as indicated above, a client, businessman, and 
friend of Grifols, Domingo Brasó, as a new partner. The two young sons also 
became partners with the father, the mother, and Brasó. The capital of Labora-
torios Grifols S.A. expanded in 1946 from 500,000 pesetas to 1,000,000 pese-
                                                             
9
  Historical Archive Museu Grifols in Barcelona. Hemobanco de Laboratorio Grifols SA, Memo-
ria. Patentes relacionades con la actividad del banco de sangre. Reference 6353. 
10
  Historical Archive Museu Grifols in Barcelona. Hemobanco de Laboratorio Grifols SA, Memo-
ria. Reference 6353; and Laboratorios Grifols S.A. Banco de Sangre y Plasma. Funciona-
miento económico. Reference 03178. 
11
  Historical Archive Museu Grifols in Barcelona. Hemobanco de Laboratorio Grifols SA, Memo-
ria. Reference 6353. 
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tas, which allowed for the expansion of the activities.12  Brasó, and later on his 
son, would remain enduring shareholders in the business until the early 1990s. 
The times were very tough in the country’s economy with scarcities of the 
post-civil war making investments and innovation difficult. Grifols was a sin-
gular exception of a very small lab developing and investing in innovative 
activities that had started in the early 1910s. The entrepreneurial attitude of the 
father was continued by the sons. Victor Grifols travelled to England in 1946, 
one year after the end of World War II and in the same year as the entrance of 
the new partner into the family firm, to explore new products and potential 
alliances with British subsidiaries in the UK of North American corporations 
like British Hayden to jointly produce penicillin in Spain. On that same trip, 
Victor Grifols visited the Royal Society of Pharmacy, distinguished Spanish 
doctors in the exile (e.g., Trueta and Gabarró, Duran y Jordà), and British 
houses producing medical instruments and products like Burroughs Welcome 
and Co.13 
3.2  The Alliances with North American Corporations and the Role 
of Friendship Ties in the Enduring Cultural Management of the 
Alliances, 1950s-1970s 
Friendship with the owner of a pharmacy in Barcelona, Ricardo Roca de Vi-
ñals, who was a distributor in Spain of the North American company Dade 
Reagents from Miami, Florida, fostered conversations in the 1950s about ex-
porting Grifols serums to the United States in exchange for imports of reagents 
and other products for the Grifols and the Roca de Viñals firms. Rigid interven-
tion in foreign payments and currency in Spain before 1959 made both confi-
dential agreements based on trust and trustable networks necessary to begin the 
first monthly exports of Grifols plasma derived products to Dade Reagents in 
the United States during 1957 and 1958.14 The importance of this foreign trade 
lay more on the qualitative side than in the quantitative value; the relevant 
issues for the Spanish firms were to keep in touch with the most updated clini-
cal analysis technology that was in the United States as of the 1950s and to 
learn how to establish a win-win alliance with a leading partner of that country. 
These early contacts provided knowledge about how a small lab should under-
take international activities. This led to further agreements with Dade Reagents 
and American Hospital Supply Corp, two leading manufacturers and distribu-
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  Historical Archive Museu Grifols in Barcelona. Memoria sobre el viaje a Inglaterra realizado 
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tors of hospital supply equipment, in 1961, when the joint venture Dade Grifols 
was established (Fernández Pérez, Puig, García-Canal, and Guillén 2017).  
In a long six-page letter addressed to Joe Potts of Dade Reagents Inc. and 
signed by Victor Grifols Lucas on the 29th of March, 1969, Grifols explained 
that, in 1965, the Barcelona company Hubber (founded in 1951 by Felix Gal-
lardo Carrera who had been in the last ten years the most important local client 
of the plasma produced by Grifols) started investments to vertically integrate 
the production of plasma in their own factory, reducing the quantity of plasma 
bought to Grifols by half and formally pressing the Ministry of Health in Spain 
to forbid plasma exports. Grifols felt this was a threat. He shared with Potts his 
concern that this could be a strategy of Hubber to integrate the industry in 
Barcelona and get rid of Grifols by collapsing them in the domestic market 
(half of the sales in Spain went to Hubber in the early 1960s and, due to Hub-
ber’s size, they could not be easily substituted by an alternative client absorb-
ing stocks of plasma in Spain) and in the international markets (where more 
than half of the Grifols’ total sales went, a sign of their competitive entry into 
the tough and sensible health care markets of Europe and the US). Grifols had 
been exporting more than half of their total sales before 1965, the same year 
that, according to Victor Grifols Lucas’ letter:  
the Spanish Ministry, doubtlessly influenced by Hubber’s complaints pub-
lished the decree of prohibition of export of plasma ... Hubber S.A. has a great 
influence in the Dirección General de Sanidad as well as in other regulatory 
centers of the polítics of this country.15  
It may be for this reason, or for others, that Grifols complains in the letter about 
how they had problems with their main Spanish client in 1969, how they were 
accumulating blood and stocks due to the governance of the blood banks (regu-
lar paid donations and regular tests on the Health of donors), how they could 
not export their surplus from their network of blood banks due to the ban on 
blood exports of the government of 1965, and how they had losses and had to 
increase the holidays of their employees at the blood bank to reduce stocks and 
losses.  
Grifols could have right then withdrawn from the business but instead de-
cided a counter-cyclical strategy: they would enter the business of their main 
local competitor, Hubber, and manufacture plasma derivatives, they would 
integrate vertically forward, and they would invest in a US style factory that 
could produce FDA products authorized to be sold in the US in the future. The 
plans were indeed visionary, particularly in times of declining sales and bur-
densome regulatory problems. They involved convincing US partners to enter 
with them into a joint venture to help them grow in scale and scope and inter-
nationalize products of higher added value in the blood industries. The dream 
                                                             
15
  Historical Archive Museu Grifols. Letter of Victor Grifols to Joe Potts of Dade Reagents Inc. 
29 March 1969, p. 2. Reference 869. 
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was expensive, but the Grifols family signaled they would be open to sharing 
ownership, and management, with the big Corporation that had recently bought 
Dade Reagents in the US: American Hospital Supply Corporation. They signed 
a joint venture with them in 1961 which would lead to the construction of the 
new modern US style factory of Parets del Vallés in the late 1960s, one of the 
leading factories in the world today in the plasma industry. 
Dade Reagents Inc. (DR) of Miami, Florida was a relatively medium-sized 
corporation that was very innovative in the United States. It had been founded 
in 1949 by John Elliott, a military officer and scientist who had participated in 
the creation of one of the first North American blood banks (the Dade County 
Blood Bank) during World War II. DR produced blood serums and solutions 
and their exclusive distributor in the United States in the 1950s was American 
Hospital Supply (AHS). When Elliott suddenly died in 1955, AHS’s CEO, 
Foster G. Mc Gaw, made a formal proposal to merge with Elliott’s widow and 
heirs and, on the first of July, 1956, DR became a subsidiary of AHS Corpora-
tion at a purchase price of 90,000 dollars.  
Grifols’ contact with DR, and subsequently with AHS, was made possible, 
as we mentioned above, thanks to Ricardo Roca de Vinyals, a well-known 
pharmacist from Barcelona acquainted with the Grifols family and a distributor 
of DR products. Roca de Vinyals was also acquainted with the representative 
of DR in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Dr. Guillermo Anido, who was well connect-
ed with the Cuban Institute of Tropical Diseases and the La Habana Faculty of 
Medicine, where he and his brother had been very actively innovating in the 
fields of clinical analysis and lab quality control in labs. In 1957, Roca de 
Vinyals offered to help connect Grifols with DR to obtain reagents and then 
mediated to help Grifols import reagents and solutions directly from DR. Dur-
ing 1958 and 1959, a continuous flow of imports, and some exports, was re-
ported in letters and confidential invoices preserved in the Grifols archive. 
Problems in handling, storing, sending, and maintaining the small glass con-
tainers with blood derivative products in their long journey with Iberia airlines 
from Spain to Switzerland and then to the United States had to be solved and 
constituted very valuable training for the future.  
Many difficulties arose from the loss of their most important client (Labora-
torios Hubber, which decided to produce its own plasma) and the deflationary 
Plan de Estabilización designed by the government. In addition, there were 
concerns that the Franco authorities could block the commercial interaction and 
payments at any time because foreign currency was scarce. But the relationship 
with DR went ahead and a joint venture, Dade Grifols, was forged in 1960. The 
partners on the Spanish side of the agreement were the Grifols, Braso, and Dr. 
Roca de Vinyals, who died shortly before signing the notarized documents of 
the new firm.  
In 1961, Víctor Grifols Lucas travelled for the first time to Miami and 
stayed for several months. There he met the Cuban Dr. Anido, who had been 
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distributing DR products in Cuba before the revolution. With his contacts, he 
was able to negotiate with the new owners (AHS) to get a job in Dade County 
when he arrived in 1961, after escaping from purges among the staff of clinical 
centers and medical faculties in Cuba. He was hired as medical manager of the 
corporation and as manager in charge of organizing international clinical quali-
ty control conferences with other big corporations in the United States and in 
Switzerland. These conferences were frequently attended by owners and man-
agers such as Grifols. Grifols Lucas and Anido met in Miami at a very difficult 
time in the life of Anido and became friends and colleagues until the end of the 
twentieth century.  
This friendship became extremely important in the history of Grifols in sub-
sequent decades. Anido and other Cuban technical managers in AHS served as 
hybrid bridges for the Grifols firms, transferring know-how, in a more afforda-
ble way, about the standards of the Food and Drug Administration for register-
ing patents and products in the United States, about how to deal with the US 
corporation, and about who was who for potential future partnerships and col-
laborations in the global plasma and hospital equipment industries.  
The association with DR and the new joint venture Dade Grifols facilitated 
not only regular imports of much-needed reagents, solutions, and hospital and 
clinical supplies, but also the beginning of regular exports of plasma products 
from the Grifols blood bank and Laboratorios Grifols to the United States and 
Sweden up until the late 1960s. Between 1961 and 1966, exports represented 
more than half the total sales of the Grifols firms; however, the good times 
ended abruptly due to a regulatory change. In 1965, a Spanish law prohibited 
the export of human blood products and Grifols exports to the United States 
and Europe gradually declined and inevitably disappeared after 1968 – the 
prohibition lasted until the end of Francoism in 1975.  
The 1956 alliance with the owner of DR (AHS) served to keep Grifols’ ex-
pansion going. It sold a huge variety of hospital supply equipment from most of 
the North American manufacturers involved in the industry and was expanding 
beyond the United States in the late 1960s, changing its organization into that 
of a large professional corporation, integrating backwards, launching its own 
production and factories, and planning its own internationalization. In this 
context, AHS fully acquired the Grifols shares formerly owned by its subsidi-
ary in 1968 and more visibly and directly became the lab’s US partner, increas-
ing the number of exclusive products distributed through Grifols among the 
growing number of Spanish hospitals. 
It is important to keep in mind that AHS was founded in 1921 by an experi-
enced salesman, Foster G. Mc Gaw, and a business angel from the construction 
sector, Harry L. Drake, to create and connect the previously fragmented market 
of the hospital supply business in the United States. They offered their com-
mercial services to hundreds of small manufacturers dispersed throughout the 
country, offering to sell their products – on commission – to distant hospitals 
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that were sprinkled across the United States. They began production only in the 
1960s, with backward vertical integration, and were tremendously innovative 
in the organization and training of their salesforce and their technical staff 
thanks to the leadership, experience, and organizational ideas of McGaw (Stur-
divant 1970).  
AHS had plenty to sell and to teach to the small yet ambitious Grifols lab. 
The abundance of products sent to Dade Grifols, particularly cardiovascular 
products and a diversity of supplies for hospital needs, required the Grifols 
staff to learn many new procedures (e.g., how to keep track of the movement of 
products in storage, how to maintain the products, how to write the invoices in 
a standardized way, how to train the sales staff, how to deal with staff in hospi-
tals, how to handle logistics in the transportation and storage of products to 
reduce losses). The few preserved records of sales of AHS products through 
Dade Grifols reveal that, in the 1970s, sales and profits from Dade Grifols in 
some years represented up to ten times those obtained in the other firms in the 
Grifols network (i.e., the blood bank, Gri-Cel - a producer of lab instruments, 
Laboratorios Grifols).  
The growth in sales and staff was so successful that it necessitated a new 
building outside the city of Barcelona, big enough to organize Grifols’ large-
scale production and commercialization. The factory in Parets del Vallès was 
launched in 1972 by CEO Víctor Grifols Lucas. Land was bought in 1966 for 
this purpose and authorizations were obtained. The factory was completed in 
1970 and began operating with all the necessary licenses in 1972. It had been 
designed to closely follow North American standards of quality control in 
production, under the supervision and in close coordination with AHS’s tech-
nical staff. Víctor Grifols Lucas, from the third generation of the Grifols fami-
ly, and his son Víctor Grifols Roura, from the fourth generation, worked to-
gether to learn how a modern factory in the biopharmaceutical industries was 
built. More professional routines in accountancy were adopted, computers were 
introduced, and human resources began to be more efficiently organized. In 
Dade Grifols, women with degrees in Chemistry and Pharmacy occupied top 
managerial and technical positions. 
There were not many competitors in the Grifols’ niche market – Laboratori-
os Hubber, Laboratorios Leti, Landerlan, Llorente, and the Spanish subsidiaries 
of the German Behringwerke and the US Baxter were the most important ones–
but all of them were expanding fast as they also perceived the same opportuni-
ties for growth.  
3.3 New International Alliances, Organizational Challenges, and 
Generational Change, 1970s-1990s 
Therefore, besides innovation in production, the young Víctor Grifols Roura, 
when he joined the company in 1973, took it upon himself to dramatically 
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improve the informal personalistic routines of the previous generation of com-
mercial managers. Antonio Ruiz, who had been in the company managing the 
commercial and administrative functions of the lab in close connection with the 
Grifols owners since 1951, retired and died in the early 1980s and Grifols 
Roura took over these responsibilities with new energy.  
He was able to create a new generation of commercial agents with whom he 
put together a team in charge of developing a sales network in Spain. For this, 
he employed the sales representatives as salaried staff and started organizing 
general meetings in 1981 to homogenize sales strategies. Coinciding with the 
radical organizational shift that took place after 1982, the firm Movaco was 
created to organize and create commercial offices with salaried employees 
devoted exclusively to Grifols products in different Spanish provinces – Valen-
cia, Seville, Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, and A Coruña. Movaco was estab-
lished at the same time as the Grifols Group holding was formed (1987) and its 
purpose was to overcome past inefficiencies in the coordination of sales and 
production, to organize the professional training of the sales workforce, and to 
increase efficiency in selling the diversity of exclusive products from their 
North American suppliers to Spanish hospitals.  
The context changed in the country and the company after 1975 with the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy that came after Franco’s demise and 
with the rapid integration of the country into European institutions and markets 
after 1986. Formerly scarce strategic resources now could be more easily intro-
duced into the country and the lab transforming the company into a global 
corporation. Víctor Grifols Roura, from the fourth Grifols generation, joined 
the company and, following the family traditions of strategic alliances with 
leaders in their field, sealed a new alliance with Alpha Therapeutic Corporation 
(ATC), the North American subsidiary of the Japanese global Green Cross 
Corporation. After 1975, and particularly after 1982, mass production tech-
niques, global channels of distribution, long-term capital invested by foreign 
banks and investors, and professional managers in business administration were 
introduced very rapidly. It was indeed a Chandlerian revolution, with dramatic 
changes taking place in three areas: improvement and increase of the produc-
tion capacity following the US Food and Drug Administration’s standards; 
organization of the sales force at home and foreign direct investments abroad; 
and the creation of the Grifols Group, a formal business group managed by a 
team of Spanish, North American, and Japanese professionals in business ad-
ministration who shared top managerial responsibilities in the coordination of 
investments, production, and sales with a global perspective. 
In management, three changes took place one after the other between 1975 
and 1985 that made the previous growth in scale and scope in production and 
distribution possible: (i) the reorganization of the sales departments; (ii) the 
improved organization of internationalization; (iii) and the creation of a formal 
business group with functional divisions and business lines (e.g., hospitals, 
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solutions, diagnostics). All three changes took place during a time that is con-
flictual in most family businesses; a period of generational transition. The 
founder of Laboratorios Grifols, José Antonio Grifols Roig, died in 1976, three 
years after his grandson, Víctor Grifols Roura, of the fourth generation, had 
joined the company in the sales department, and only four years after the open-
ing of the new US-style factory in Parets del Vallès in 1972. The emotional 
attachment to the family business and the shared long-term values focused on 
seriousness and professionalism in a very special business sector help explain 
the peaceful and very positive coexistence of the third (Víctor Grifols Lucas) 
and fourth (Víctor Grifols Roura) generations of the Grifols family in the top 
management, representing half of the shares owned in the different joint ven-
tures with North American and Japanese partners.  
Concurrently, there was a substantial shift and tensions among the managers 
on the board representing the North American shareholders in the Grifols firms. 
AHS – through its subsidiary DR and later alone – was on the managing board 
of Dade Grifols, Gri-Cel, and Laboratorios Grifols from 1960 until 1976. With 
AHS suffering the impact of powerful competitors at home and the negative 
effects of the late-1970s crisis on sales, it decided to sell its 50 percent of the 
shares in Laboratorios Grifols. AHS invited Grifols to choose the company it 
would sell its shares to in order to avoid damaging its interests. Dr. Guillermo 
Anido’s advice was important in this regard; he suggested the name of ATC, a 
North American subsidiary of the Japanese Green Cross Corporation and a 
global player in the blood industries. In a later interview, the Japanese CEO 
indicated that they liked doing business with the small Spanish lab because it 
had a long-term conservative attitude, typical of a family business, and they 
preferred a partner like this over an aggressive short-term dividend-oriented 
North American or Western European company.  
The Grifols accepted the suggestion from their Cuban colleague – with 
whom they would maintain a long-term friendship despite the termination of 
the joint venture with AHS – and signed a commercial and technical coopera-
tion agreement with ATC in 1982, placing managers from ATC on the manag-
ing board. AHS still retained half of the shares in the Dade Grifols joint ven-
ture. However, just three years later, in 1985, Baxter Travenol, a traditional 
competitor of AHS in the United States, suddenly bought AHS and the 50 
percent shares it had in Dade Grifols. This was considered a threat to the inter-
ests of Grifols’ future expansion in global markets and in Spain. The Spanish 
shareholders of Dade Grifols decided to sell their 50 percent to Baxter, aban-
don their flagship company that had generated such huge profits in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and concentrate on their new partner and a new generation of man-
agers in control of the future of Laboratorios Grifols. The holding company 
Grupo Grifols was created in 1987 with the remaining firms and new firms 
(e.g., Laboratorios Grifols, Movaco, Instituto Grifols, Diagnostic Grifols, 
Logister). ATC turned out to be a great “business school” during their partner-
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ship (1982-1999), teaching Grifols how to become a global leader and to initi-
ate exports and acquisitions on a large scale. 
In 1958 and 1959, the Spanish lab had exported plasma to the United States 
and Switzerland, but in quite reduced amounts and of limited value. Between 
1960 and 1966, exports to the United States continued, and small quantities 
were also sent to Sweden and Germany, until the Spanish government’s 1965 
prohibition on exporting human blood products. The prohibition was lifted in 
the early 1970s and in 1974 Víctor Grifols Roura, who had just joined the 
company as the first member of the fourth generation with managerial respon-
sibilities, met a commercial agent with whom agreements to export products to 
the then Portuguese Angola were signed. Angola became independent soon 
after and some limited exports were sent to Denmark. The partnership with 
ATC represented a radical change in the company’s international department. 
Víctor Grifols Lucas and his son, Víctor Grifols Roura, travelled to China in 
1983, the first year of the partnership, to start exports in a country where they 
had no idea how to do business. The Green Cross Corporation, owner of ATC, 
asked Grifols to export their plasma products together with Grifols’ own prod-
ucts to China; at that time, Japanese blood products were forbidden in China. 
From 1983 to 1985, the Grifols entrepreneurs learned how difficult it was to 
find even a secretary through the embassy that could start the paperwork that 
would allow them to establish a commercial representative and to export to 
China. Due to this, they experienced great organizational difficulties of every 
kind. After 1982, when news of the AIDS epidemic started to spread and the 
Food and Drug Administration began recommending heating blood stocks, 
China soon increased controls and reduced, later stopping, imports.  
Grifols became the leader in the supply of key plasma proteins for the Span-
ish market in the 1980s. In 1989, the name of the joint venture was established 
as Alpha Grifols. ATC is also very significant for understanding two key ele-
ments of the 1980s and 1990s (the relationship ended in 1999):  
the fast speed of the joint venture’s acquisitions and foreign direct investment; 
and its privileged contacts with foreign banks that provided huge amounts of 
external capital with which to finance international expansion and moderniza-
tion in production, distribution, and the managerial professionalization of the 
group. (Garcia-Ruiz and Fernandez-Perez 2017, 74) 
As the statistical information indicates, it was during the joint venture with 
ATC that three new focuses were added to the Grifols Group’s previous trajec-
tory: (i) long-term capital endowment from outside sources; (ii) huge invest-
ments in Europe, America, and Asia; and (iii) a rapid decline in the percentage 
of sales represented by the Spanish market in the structure of the group’s total 
sales. 
New premises, companies, and acquisitions evolved as follows: Portugal 
(1988), Argentina (1991), Mexico (1993), Germany/Italy/United Kingdom 
(1997), Brazil (1998), and Slovakia/France (1999). In 1999, ATC and Grifols 
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ended their joint venture due to a combination of problems related to a broader 
crisis affecting the Green Cross Corporation in Japan, and its subsidiaries in 
Europe, and to disagreements about how to manage the uncertainty of the first 
years of the AIDS epidemic in the industry (from a technical point of view). 
After their friendly separation, Grifols felt strong enough and with enough 
resources and know-how to go it alone and invested in subsidiaries in the Unit-
ed States (ATC’s factory) and Malaysia (2003), in Poland (2004), once more in 
the United States (2006), in representative offices in Japan (2006) and in China 
(2007), and in more subsidiaries in Switzerland (2009) and in Colombia and 
Nordic countries (2010). In 2011, they acquired Talecris in the United States 
for around 3 billion US dollars, which was followed in 2014 with assets from 
Novartis Diagnostics and in 2015 by the purchase of 45 percent of Alkahest, 
both also in the United States. In recent years, beyond the United States (acqui-
sition of assets of Hologic in 2017), Grifols has increased its presence in Cana-
da and Ireland.16 
Information from the corporation reveals that long-term sources of external 
capital played an increasingly relevant role in financing, innovations and pa-
tents, and acquisitions abroad. Internal resources became insufficient and syn-
dicated bank loans, with a combination of local and foreign banks, made their 
appearance. After 2006, when Grifols was listed in the Spanish stock market, 
more dispersed investors contributed external capital to the group from all over 
the world. 
The partnership with ATC ended in 1999, but the Spanish financial and 
commercial departments of Grifols had by then learned how to operate as a 
global corporation. During the first 15 years of the twenty-first century, staff 
graduated in business and economics in local institutions received fast practical 
training in how to export worldwide, how to operate with European and North 
American corporations, and how to obtain licenses in the toughest pharmaceu-
tical markets of the world where the highest return on investments could be 
obtained. The accumulation of lessons and resources among Grifols’ human 
capital also meant a capacity to deal with global sources of financing for inter-
nationalization, right during the years when deregulation and the globalization 
of finances offered many opportunities for global investment and funding (Gar-
cía Ruiz and Fernández Pérez forthcoming). Grifols had enough strength to 
take advantage of the new abundance of opportunities to access capital and to 
invest in tough markets, and it did so initially in the biotech industry in West-
ern Europe and the United States and later in Asia.  
                                                             
16
  Detail of acquisitions and financial information kindly provided by Nuria Pascual, from 
Grifols, by email to author 09/07/2017. 
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4. Conclusions 
Biomedical industries seem to be a business of large Chandlerian corporations 
run by professional scientists and managers who take decisions based not on 
personal relationships but on market rationale and scientific organization meth-
ods. The plasma industry shows that, throughout more than half a century, the 
foundations of the industry had to do with trust-based personal and professional 
relationships between entrepreneurial owners and managers of small and large 
firms of very diverse business cultures. Long-term decisions to establish ex-
pensive acquisitions and investments, alliances, or risky new scientific projects 
were taken by a closely related group of people. Therefore, in this industry one 
could perfectly demonstrate the efficiency of collective entrepreneurship. The 
reduction of risks in a very sensitive health care industry may have played a 
role in the sustained relevance of entrepreneurial trust-based cooperation be-
tween Spaniards, Germans, North Americans, and the Japanese. But sharing 
similar long-term trust in family-based companies did also play a role. The 
different owners and managers involved in this story believed in similar values: 
reputation, safety, long-term investments, long-term results, trust, and reliabil-
ity.  
This article analyzes the story of the Grifols business in Spain to show that 
problems of a small size, lack of institutional support, competition or scarcity 
of financial resources were problems that could be overcome not only through 
specialization in market niches, but also, and that is the contribution of this 
article, through enduring and resilient trust-based personal and professional 
relationships in a very specialized science-based industry.  
The opportunity to supply specialized products in Spain after the 1960s 
required new resources: technology, organizational know-how, and capital. 
These resources were sought after by leading corporations in the United 
States. In the 1950s, entry barriers for small labs trying to establish commercial 
ties with big North American corporations were high. Friendship with a Span-
ish colleague who had ties with a prestigious Cuban doctor helped. The Cuban 
Guillermo Anido, exiled to Miami in the 1960s, started working in two innova-
tive North American corporations of the health care industries: Dade Reagents 
and American Hospital Supply Co. Anido’s friendship with Grifols could help 
a North American corporation enter into the expanding Spanish market of 
hospital equipment of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, Anido’s back-
ground in the quality control of laboratories in Cuba and his reputation in Mi-
ami’s corporations was a channel through which Grifols benefitted to improve 
internal processes and accelerate their internationalization horizons.  
Internal and external threats suffered in the 1970s transformed the inter-
nal composition of the Grifols entrepreneurial group in the years to come. The  
death of the founder of the lab, generational transition, changes in the top 
management, more powerful competitors in Spain and in the United States, 
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and the decision of the US partner to leave the partnership posed obsta-
cles and initiated change. This time of transition was considerably smoothed by 
seeking new partners and new members of the entrepreneurial group, again 
with the intervention of their friend Dr. Guillermo Anido. The Cuban doctor 
recommended that the Spaniards accept Alpha Therapeutic Corporation as 
their new partners. ATC was the subsidiary in the United States of the Japanese 
Green Cross Corporation. It was a giant in the industry with up to 5 0  times 
the production capacity of Grifols. It meant a globalization of the entre-
preneurial group’s projects and corporations. The new Japanese partners 
declared later that they decided to seal an alliance with the small Spanish firm 
because they were a family firm seeking long-term goals and quality, values 
shared by the Japanese firm. Personal friendship with the Japanese managers 
started and remained for decades. Friendships also endured with the Cuban Dr. 
Anido until his death, with the son of their 1946 local business angel Brasó, 
and the widow and relatives of their friend Roca Vinyals who had provided the 
link with Dr. Anido. Loyalty to their partners ensured trust, stability, a long-
term approach to the business, and a stable distribution of dividends to all 
throughout the decades. Collective entrepreneurship paid off. 
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